Building reliable institutions that support a market system is undoubtedly a central precondition for successful economic transition. This paper presents indicators on the predictability of the institutional framework across twenty transition economies and then investigates whether these indicators can explain differences in their economic performance. The results suggest that differences in the degree of predictability of the institutional framework may indeed be an important factor in explaining differences in foreign direct investment as well as differences in economic growth across transitional economies. 1 We would like to thank Ajay Chhibber for his extraordinary support and help in our research. We also want to thank Michael Geller for outstanding editorial assistance.
Introduction
One of the crucial preconditions for economic transition is to build institutions that support a market system. Such institutions range from bankruptcy laws to regulations on insider trading to rules defining property and contract rights. New laws and regulations should be enacted quickly along with the establishment of enforcement agencies. It is not an easy task to put into place the rules that create a level playing field and a predictable institutional framework for market development. In fact, evidence in this paper suggests that all transition economies still have a long way to go in building such institutions. However, there are substantial differences in the relative success in building institutions in various transition economies.
Furthermore we provide some indication that differences in successfully building a reliable institutional framework (as perceived by the private sector of the respective country) may contribute to explain relative economic performance.
The paper is based on new survey data on the institutional framework of 20 transition countries. The data was collected during a global private sector survey project done for the World Bank in preparation of the World Development Report 1997. The most relevant data for transition economies is first presented region by region and in a second step we analyze the relation of various indicators derived from the data set and economic performance.
The premise of the WDR survey was to obtain, to compare, and to quantify private firms' perceptions on the reliability of regulations, policies, and laws. To this end we designed a multiple choice questionnaire to capture cross-country differences of the reliability of the institutional framework.
2 The survey covers a stratified sample of entrepreneurs in Africa, the Americas, Asia, the Commonwealth of Independent States (former Soviet Union), Eastern
Europe, Western Europe, and the Middle East. The overall survey results appear in Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder (1997a) , and growth and investment regressions for the whole survey sample are discussed in Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder (1997b) . Both of these papers are companion pieces to this paper.
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The questionnaire together with region by region results is displayed in the appendix.
This paper represents the first step in the direction toward a more detailed analysis for one specific region. Transition economies were chosen for several reasons. First, the data set is quite comprehensive covering 20 formerly planned economies including most of the "large"
countries-all in various stages of transition. Second, the transition process itself produces institutional uncertainties that impede private business development. Measurement of the minimization and/or quick elimination of these institutional uncertainties could potentially provide evidence of a successful recovery. Third, correlating institutional measures to macroeconomic data presents a special challenge in the case of transition countries where there tends to be wide ranges of data reliability-even in the last few years. This proved to be a problem in the econometric analysis for the whole sample where data of very different quality was to be mixed together. 3 This leads to the natural conclusion that the transition economies should be analyzed separately from all the other surveyed regions.
The paper is divided into two parts. Part I presents descriptive statistics for all major questions for each of the six geographical sub-regions of Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States. The six geographical sub-regions are considered individually in five major categories of institutional reliability. Part II uses one representative indicator from each of these five categories as well as an overall indicator of credibility introduced in Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder (1997b) and analyzes their relationship to cross-country differences in economic performance. The hypothesis we are testing is that higher institutional reliability, regardless of the specific measure, is good for economic performance. As a measure of economic performance we work with the standard per capita growth rate. In addition we use an indirect indicator of differences in performance-foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP-which is probably a more reliable measure for cross-country analysis in transition economies.
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See Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder (1997b) .
Given the situation of recently convened, inexperienced legislative bodies in transition countries, this dimension of uncertainty is probably the most unavoidable during the process of transition. After all, such a large structural change is quite unique, mistakes and trial and error are unavoidable. Predictability, therefore, was not expected to be high. But what is interesting is that there are differences in the perceptions of entrepreneurs in different countries. The transition process seems to have been more predictable in some countries than in others.
Percentage of firms that consider this a problem
Policy surprises (question 1 in the survey questionnaire).
This question addresses the problem of predictability from the most general perspective asking about problems with unexpected changes in rules, laws and policies.
Lack of Credibility of announcements (question 2 in the survey questionnaire).
In this question entrepreneurs were asked whether they thought that the government would stick to major announced policies.
Percentage of firms that consider this a problem Overall, it appears that unpredictable rule changes are an important problem for the entrepreneurs in transition economies. What can also be derived is that businesses want a more significant role in rulemaking. The overall dissatisfaction of transition economy respondents with the possibilities of participation was the highest among all regions surveyed.
On a more positive note predictability results from some more advanced transition economies indicate a better situation. For instance, in the Visegrad countries, the fear of retroactive changes is relatively low-only about 38 percent of respondents reported such a fear.
This is comparable to the levels in East and Southeast Asian countries (see Brunetti, Kisunko, Weder, 1997a) . 
II. Political Stability
The second dimension of institutional reliability concentrates on government changes. High overall uncertainty about regular changes in government might be explained through the polarized political spectrum in transitional countries. Recorded fears were lowest in the Visegrad countries, where, by the time of the survey, several free democratic elections had produced significant changes in the party structures of governments but had not led to drastic changes in the economic course. Following this logic the poor performance of the Caucasus region and relatively favorable performance of Slavic states and Moldova might be understood.
The relatively good performance of the Balkan region and the relatively poor performance of Baltic states defy performance expectations set up by this logic.
It seems that in countries where the state is viewed as more stable and the balance of power between different political groups is established, fears of unconstitutional changes of government are lower. These factors distinguish the Visegrad countries and the Baltics from the rest of the regions .
III. Property rights security
The third dimension of the reliability in the institutional framework focuses on security of property and contract rights. In contrast to the predictability of rules and political stability, this dimension and the next two concentrate on law enforcement not the lawmaking process. We inquire whether firms can rely on a clear and predictable enforcement of these rules. Two questions in this section check whether firms perceive criminal action as a major problem, and more directly, whether they rely on state authorities to protect them.
Percentage of firms that consider this a problem 
Slavic & Moldova
Across regions, the confidence of business people about government's ability to provide property and personal protection differs little. Compared to other regions entrepreneurs in the Caucasus feel the "safest"-70 percent report that they are not confident that state authorities will protect them and their property. Overall, the responses for these transition economies show that the state fails to provide this basic public service of protection to the local population.
IV. Judiciary reliability
This category concerns the predictability of the judiciary and whether lack of such predictability represents a major problem for doing business. 
V. Corruption
The extent and the nature of corruption is the fifth dimension of institutional reliability.
A high level of corruption is a sign of large bureaucratic discretion and is, therefore, likely to be related to institutional uncertainties. Three questions are asked in this category. The first question focuses on the simple extent of corrupt practices while the other two questions inquire whether the bribe amount is known in advance and whether the bribe guarantees delivery of the service. 4 Corruption would thus be rendered a transaction cost with effects similar to a tax rather than creating genuine uncertainties on the institutional framework.
Percentage of firms that consider this a problem The two regions where entrepreneurs reported the lowest frequency of "additional payments" were Visegrad and the Baltic countries-only about 40 percent of respondents made these additional payments more than "sometimes." This result is about ten percentage points higher than in South and Southeast Asia (see Brunetti, Kisunko, Weder, 1997a) . In another comparison this result is much better than that of the Caucasus region where the regional average was 69 percent. Other transition economy results are as follows: the Balkans (57 percent), Central Asia (66 percent), and Slavic republics of the FSU and Moldova (59 percent).
The fear of being forced to pay multiple bribes to different bureaucrats for the same service was lowest in Visegrad and Baltic countries-24 percent on average in each of these 
II. Effects on economic performance
The effects of institutional uncertainty on economic performance in transition countries are analyzed using the categories presented in the previous part. After discussing the empirical approach we present results of institutional uncertainty indicators in regressions for foreign direct investment and for growth.
Empirical Strategy
Our aim is to test the effects of institutional uncertainty as it relates to predictability of rules, political stability, property rights security, judiciary reliability and lack of corruption. We choose a single representative question from each category of institutional uncertainty and test it against foreign direct investment and growth. Additionally we test an average indicator that is composed of several questions and can be interpreted as an overall indicator of the credibility of rules. 5 The results of the indicators from the remaining questions presented in the descriptive part are confined to appendix 4.
Indicators of institutional uncertainty are constructed by calculating simple averages of the responses. The questions were all multiple choice with answers ranging from 1 to 6. All
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In Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder (1997b) we test this overall indicator on growth and investment in a larger sample of countries.
indicators are constructed in such a manner that 6 is the best choice (least uncertainty) and 1 the worst (most uncertainty). Consequently we expect a positive relationship with both FDI and growth. Every section included questions about conditions 5 year ago and these are used to construct earlier values of the indicator. The average of the earlier and the present indicator is used in the regression analysis as an average for the period from 1990 to 1995.
We test the following specific indicators derived from the questionnaire: Predictability of rules: question no. 1
Political stability : question no. 8
Property rights security: question no. 9
Reliability of the judiciary: question no. 11
Lack of corruption: question no. 14 Credibility: questions 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14 6 The dependent variables are either FDI inflows as a share of GDP or average growth rate of GDP. We analyze foreign direct investment because this is likely to be among the most reliable data available for transition economies and can also be interpreted as an overall indicator of economic performance. We also conduct standard growth analysis. The period for both endogenous variables is an average of three years, 1993-1995. This time period was selected in order to avoid the most severe initial shocks that the transition process involved.
We use the same specifications in all the foreign direct investment and growth regressions. First we test the indicator alone, then include other economic variables as controls.
Because of the small sample size we cannot control simultaneously for many additional factors,
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The indicator is constructed in the same manner as in Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder (1997b) , i.e. taking an average of the questions in the 5 categories. so that we include the controls one by one. 7 We control for GNP per capita in the initial year (GNP92), 8 the secondary school enrollment rate in the initial year (school), the average degree of openness to international trade (measured as the sum of export and import share in GDP (openness), the average rate of government consumption (gov. cons.), and the average inflation rate (inflation). All data are derived from the World Economic Indicators (World Bank 1997).
These control variables are standard in growth regressions 9 : The first two control for differences in initial conditions and the latter three for differences in policies. The rational for including them in FDI regressions is the following: initial income per capita is an indicator of how attractive the market is for the foreign investor; schooling is a measure of human capital, therefore the higher this capital the more productive is as a prospective investment. Openness, inflation, and government consumption can be interpreted as proxies for policy distortions.
Market size-a criterion often mentioned by multinational companies as influencing their investment decision-is taken into account indirectly because FDI is considered as a percent of GDP.
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Endogeneity might be a problem in the growth regressions, especially because we are studying transition economies. 11 The causality could be running from successful transition--which would express itself in higher economic performance--to better institutions. In an attempt to mitigate this problem we use the average value of the indicator for 1990-1995, rather than the actual value of 1995. Also, we run regressions using the indicator of political rights (Freedom House 1994) as an instrument. The rational for using political rights as an instrument for institutional reliability is that (i) political rights are not correlated with growth (this has been substantiated by a large number of empirical cross country studies on growth 12 ) and (ii) political rights, i.e. the quality of the election process and more generally the degree of democratic control 7
The maximum sample size is 18 countries. Macedonia and Albania had to be excluded because in those countries the survey did not ask about the situation 5 years ago. Therefore, we were unable to calculate average values of the indicators for these two countries. See e.g. Barro (1991) or Levine and Renelt (1992) . 10 We also experimented with the population as a proxy for market size but the variable proved to be insignificant.
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The causality between institutions and FDI inflows is not likely to be problematic. are likely to be related with the reliability of the institutional framework. In general, mature democracies will provide better protection of property rights, more political stability, and more predictability. In the full sample of 69 countries the correlation between the average credibility indicator and political rights is 0.67, in our sample of transition economies it is 0.70.
Of course, given that better causality tests cannot be performed and macro data is sparse (and in the case of growth their quality is also doubtful), the empirical analysis should be viewed as exploratory and the results merely indicative of the importance of institutional variables.
Effects of institutional reliability on foreign direct investment
Foreign direct investment is interesting for two reasons. First, foreign investors are likely to be particularly sensitive to institutional problems. These investors are outsiders in the political process. They are not familiar with the local bureaucracy, are more familiar with market economies, and are not always welcomed locally. 13 Second, this data is likely to be among the most reliable data available for transition economies-FDI inflows are unlikely to go unrecorded.
We interpret this variable as an overall indicator of economic performance. Tables 1 to 6 present results for the different indicators of institutional reliability. Table 1 shows the results for the predictability of rules (question 1). In the single regression this indicator is significant only on the 10 percent level, when we include the control variables it becomes insignificant in 3 out of 5 cases. It remains significant at the 10 percent level in one case and is significant at the 5 percent level in another case. The R 2 is between 4 and 15 percent.
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See for instance Brunetti and Weder (1995) for a survey of studies on demoncracy and growth.
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In a survey of 117 senior managers of Western manufacturing companies Lankes and Venables (1996) find that political stability and perceived risk influence FDI inflows in transition economies. From these results it appears that the predictability of rules is not very closely associated with FDI. This might be inherent to transition: the process of such a major economic restructuring dictates a low expectation of the predictability of rules and policies and will, therefore, not be the main concern of investment decisions.
As evidenced in most regressions displayed in this section, the control variables tend to have the predicted sign, but they are mostly not significant on conventional levels. In Table 1 , the level of GNP is positive indicating that a higher income per person as a proxy for a bigger market tends to encourage FDI. The indicator of openness is usually positive as is the schooling variable. A higher level of human capital and more openness seems to be beneficial for FDI although none of the respective coefficients is significant on conventional levels. We unsuccessfully tried to find a better specification by including the size of the population as an additional market size variable. Government consumption and inflation tend to be negative in the FDI-regressions probably meaning that more government involvement and more price instability represent distortions that may scare away foreign investors. In all cases, however, these propositions are only weakly supported given that the respective variables are mostly insignificant in the FDI-regressions. Table 2 shows results for the political stability indicator. This indicator fares much better than the previously examined one. It is significant on the 1 percent level in all cases, and the simple specifications tested explain about 66 percent in the FDI variation across our set of countries. Given that the other controls are insignificant most of the explanation comes from the indicator of political stability. It appears that the expectation of policy surprises due to irregular government changes is a major determinant of foreign investor's decisions. Table 3 presents results for the security of property rights. This indicator is also highly significant in all regressions and explains over half of the variation in FDI. It seems to be the case that the perception of the private sector about the security of their property from theft and crime is another major factor in explaining transition countries' relative success in attracting FDI. Table 4 presents the results for the indicator of the judiciary reliability . Like the previous two indicators it is significant in all regressions on the 1 percent level and explains a large part of the cross country variation in FDI inflows. Based on this result, building a reliable judiciary should be a priority for transition economies wishing to attract foreign capital. Table 5 shows the results for the indicator that measures the absence of corruption. This indicator is also significant on the 1 percent level in 5 out of 6 cases and significant on the 5 percent level in the regression controlling for inflation. The R 2 is about 50 percent. Table 6 shows the results for this overall indicator. It is highly significant in all regressions and explains 70 percent in the variation of FDI inflow. These results appear to confirm our expectation that foreign investors are highly susceptible to institutional uncertainty.
The same regression analysis with gross domestic investment as the dependent variable was also examined. The results were generally not significant. It is not obvious why results for FDI and total investment should differ so much. Major data problems in the total investment figures for transition economies could be the culprit. In many cases this data is mainly reflecting the traditional sector's activity-the problems of capturing the activity of the emerging private sector are notorious. Another explanation could be that the share of investment is not really a good indicator of performance in transition because the countries that lag in the transition process are still investing larger amounts into unproductive ventures. In any case it is strange that the excellent results that we obtain with FDI do not show in total investment. Because of the data problems mentioned above, we tend to have more confidence in the FDI results.
Effects of institutional predictability on per capita growth
Usual cross-country analysis of the reasons for differences in economic performance focus on per capita growth rates as the variable to be explained. As was discussed earlier, growth data for transition economies has suffered from inaccuracy and lack of comparability. The results of this section should, therefore, be viewed with more caution than the previous one and merely indicative of the effects of institutional predictability on growth in transition economies.
To reduce data problems we focus on the most recent period where data is available-from 1993 to 1995. Tables 7 to 12 estimate exactly the same specifications we used for FDI-regressions with per capita growth as the endogenous variable.The drawback is that it might be problematic to estimate growth regressions with averages of such a short time period. Table 7 shows the results for the measure of predictability of rules. The variable has the expected positive sign in all specifications and tends to be significant. It is significant on the 1 percent-level in the regression controlling for openness and on the 5 percent-level in the single regression. In the specification controlling for government consumption, it is significant on the 10 percent-level as well as in the specification controlling for GNP. Only in the remaining two specifications it is insignificant. This replicates the results for the FDI regressions: the predictability of rules variable is the least robust in growth regressions-probably for the same reasons. insignificant, and its sign switches depending on the institutional variables tested. In traditional growth analysis this variable would be expected to be negative due to the convergence effect predicted by neoclassical growth theory. However for the very short time period estimated here this convergence effect is unlikely to show up. Openness has the expected positive sign in all specifications, however, it is insignificant in all cases. Government consumption, interestingly and in contrast to most other growth studies, is positive in all specifications. In some government consumption is even significantly so. The proxy for human capital is positive in all but one case but remains completely insignificant. Finally inflation has the expected negative sign but is only occasionally significant at conventional levels. All in all the specifications are not very convincing. We had difficulty unearthing any significant variables with the exception of our indicators of institutional uncertainty in growth-regressions for this sample of transition countries. Table 8 shows that political stability is positive and highly significant in all specifications estimated. The variable alone explains 50 percent of the variation of growth rates in our sample. Table 9 demonstrates the importance of property rights security for economic growth in the countries under consideration. The variable is always positive and alone explains about one third of the variation in growth rates. It is significant at the 1 percent level in the single regression as well as in the regression controlling for government consumption. In all other specifications the indicator of property rights security is significant on the 5 percent-confidence level. Table 10 estimates the indicator of the reliability of the judiciary in growth regressions.
The indicator has the expected positive sign and is significant on the 5 percent-level in the single regression explaining about 20 percent of the variation in growth rates. The indicator keeps its positive sign in all specifications; in the regression controlling for government consumption it is significant on the 1 percent-level; in the one controlling for openness on the 5 percent-level and in the one controlling for GNP on the 10 percent-level. In the remaining two specifications, the indicator is insignificant. Table 11 shows growth regressions for the indicator of corruption. In the single regression the coefficient of this variable has the expected positive sign and is significant on the 10 percent-level. The variable alone explains 16 percent of the variation in growth rates. In the other specifications the corruption-measure always keeps its positive sign but is not consistently significant. In the specification controlling for openness it is significant on the 5 percent-level, in the specifications controlling for GNP and government consumption respectively it is significant on the 10 percent-level and in the other specifications it is insignificant. consists of the average of questions in each of the categories mentioned above. This summary measure of the reliability of the institutional framework alone explains 27 percent of the crosscountry variations in growth rates of the transition economies. It has the expected positive sign in all specifications and in almost all cases (the exception being the specification controlling for the inflation rate) is significant on the 5 percent-level. As mentioned above, the direction of causality might be a problem for the growth regressions. For this reason Table 13 estimates instrumental variable regressions for all measures of institutional uncertainty using an indicator of political rights as instrument for the various institutional variables. The results suggest that reverse causality may not be a major problem.
All indicators are significant on the 1 percent-level. 
Summary and Conclusions
We have presented and analyzed a new data set based on firm-level surveys in transition economies. The survey aimed at measuring the degree of private entrepreneurial confidence in the institutional framework. We distinguish different dimensions of this institutional reliability namely the predictability of rules, political stability, property rights security, judiciary reliability and lack of corruption. We first presented survey results for the transition countries on a region by region basis. In a second step we studied the relationship of these different institutional indicators with cross-country differences in inflows of foreign direct investment and in per capita growth.
The regression results indicate that property rights security, political stability, judiciary reliability and lack of corruption are all very important factors affecting the inflow of foreign direct investment. The coefficients of these variables were highly significant in all specifications tested. Less clear is the importance of the predictability of rules which has always a positive sign in FDI-regressions, but it is not significant in all specifications. The growth regressions must be treated with caution as they were derived from inferior data and were examined over a very short time period. Nevertheless, they indicate that property rights security and political stability are particularly important for economic growth. The respective coefficients are always highly significant. The other institutional indicators-predictability of rules, judiciary reliability and lack of corruption-are less clearly related to cross-country differences in growth. The coefficients of these variables always have the expected sign but they are not significant in all specifications. The different indicators of institutional reliability intend to measure different phenomena but, of course, many of them overlap. They tend to be rather highly correlated. For this reason we did not estimate them in the same regressions but we constructed an indicator of credibility that is a simple average of the different dimensions. This indicator proves to be highly significant in both FDI-and growth-regressions. Overall, the results of this analysis suggest that the guarantee of a reliable institutional framework may be an important precondition for the successful transition and improved economic performance of former planned economies. 
